ICA Nature of Agreement by Minor

ICA Nature of Agreement by Minor

MOHORI BIBEE V. DHARMODAS GHOSE CASE:
 
Decided by Privy Council in 1903
Facts:
1. The plaintiff, Dharmodas Ghose, while he was a minor, mortgaged his property in favour of the defendant, Brahmo Dutt, who was a moneylender to secure a loan.
2. At the time of the transaction the attorney, who acted on behalf of the moneylender, had the knowledge that the plaintiff is a minor.
3. The minor brought an action against the moneylender stating that he was a minor when the mortgage was executed by him and, therefore, the mortgage was void and inoperative and the same should be cancelled.
4. By the time of Appeal to the Privy Council the defendant, Brahmo Dutt died, and the Appeal was prosecuted byhis executors.
 
 
CONTENTIONS OF DEFENDANT
1. The minor had fraudulently misrepresented his age, the law of estoppel should be applied against him.
In other words, he should not be allowed to plead that at the time of the transaction he was a minor and, therefore, no    relief should be given to the minor in the case; and 
2. If the plaintiffs (minor's) claim to order the cancellation of the mortgage is allowed, the minor should be asked to refund the loan taken by him, under sections 64 and 65, Indian Contract Act. 
Section 64 of the Indian Contract Act reads as under:
1. "When a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds  it, The other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained of which he is a promisor,          
The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he has received any benefit there under from another party to such contract, restore such benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received.
"Sec. 65 is as follows:
When an agreement is discovered to be void or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such     agreement or contract is bound To restore it, or To make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. 
3. The moneylender claimed the refund of the mortgage money under another provision also, i.e., sec. 41, Specific Relief Act, 1877. 
The section reads as follows :       
"On adjudging the cancellation of an instrument the Court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to make any compensation to the other which justice may require.”  
 
 
DECISION OF PRIVY COUNCIL
The Privy Council rejected this        contention.
It was held that the law of estoppel as stated in see, 115, Indian Evidence Act, was not applicable to the present case, because in this case the statement (about age) was made to a person who knew the real facts and was not misledby the untrue statement.
Sec. 64 was applicable to the case of a Voidable contract. Minor's agreement being void, sec. 64 was not applicable to the case and therefore the minor could not be asked to pay the amount under this section 
This section, like section 64, is applicable to agreement or contract between competent parties, and has no application to a case in which there never was and never could have been, any contract.
The minor, therefore, could not be asked to repay the amount even under sec. 65.
This section gives discretion to the Court to order compensation, but under the circumstances of this case, justice did not require the return of the money advanced to the minor, as the money had been advanced with the of the plaintiff.
The claim for refund under the Specific Relief Act was, therefore, disallowed.    
 
1. RATIFICATION OF THE MINOR'S AGREEMENT:
A minor's agreement being void ab initio, it is incapable of being validated by a subsequent ratification afterthe minor has attained the age of majority.        
The consideration furnished in respect of a transaction during minority cannot be considered to be a valid   consideration for a subsequent promise after attaining majority and Thus no ratification is possible of a promise made by a person during his minority.       
The consideration received by a person during his minority cannot be called consideration in its strict term within the meaning of sec. 2(d), and there is no question of that consideration being considered valid for a fresh promise. (Suraj Narain v. Sukhu Aheer) 
Promise by minor to pay for the both, if made after attaining majority, is with valid consideration and enforceable. (Kundan Bibi v. Sree Narayan) 
Though a contract by a minor is void, it is quite competent for such a person to carry on the transaction started during minority, even after attaining majority in such a way as to bind himself for the wholetransaction. (Nihalchand v. Mir Jan Mahomed Khan, Maganlal v. Raman Lai, Sindha v. Abrahim,)                                                      
 
 
2. RATIFICATION OF ACTS DONE ON MINOR'S BEHALF
A minor's agreement being void ab initio, neither he can himself enter into contract nor authorise an agent to do so on his behalf. As a minor is incapable of either making a contract himself, or authorising the same, he cannot legally ratify an act done on his behalf.A minor cannot ratify acts done on his behalf because the whole question of ratification is based on the assumption    that authority could have been conferred by the person ratifying the acts at the date when the acts were performed. (Tukaram v. Madhorao)  
 
3. NO ESTOPPEL AGAINST A MINOR 
From the various decisions of the different High Courts, we find that the consensus is that the law of estoppel does not apply against a minor. (KHAN GUL V. LAKHA SINGH, LAHORE HIGH COURT) 
He is allowed to plead minority as a defence to avoid liability under an agreement even though at the time of making the agreement, he falsely stated that he has attained the age of majority.(GANGANAND SINGH V. RAMESHWAR SINGH PATNA HIGH COURT)