1. COERCION
15.Coercion—
Coercion' is the committing, or threatening to commit, ANY ACT FORBIDDEN by the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, ANY PROPERTY, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.
EXPLANATION —
It is immaterial whether the Indian Penal Code is or not in force in the place where the coercion is employed.
ILLUSTRATIONS
A, on board an English ship on the high seas, causes B to enter into an agreement by an act amounting to criminal intimidation under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). A afterwards sues B for breach of contract at Calcutta.A has employed coercion, although his act is not an offence by the law of England, and although section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) was not in force at the time when or place where the act was done.
Coercion is said to be there where the consent of a person has been caused either by:
1. committing, or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code, or by
2. unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain any property. Such an act should be to the prejudice of any personwhatever.
ACT FORBIDDEN BY THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
If a person commits or threatens to commit an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code with a view to obtaining the consent of the other person to an agreement, the consent in such a case is deemed to have been obtained by coercion.
EXAMPLE
A threatens to shoot B if B does not agree to sell his property to A at a stated price, B's consent in this case has beenobtained by coercion.
For coercion, it is not necessary that the Indian Penal Code should be applicable at the place where the consent has been so caused.
Explanation to section 15 makes it clear that to constitute coercion, "it is immaterial whether the Indian Penal Codeis or is not in force in the place where the coercion is employed." Illustration to Sec. 15. explain the point
RANGANAYAKAMMA V. ALWAR SETTI, [A.I.R. (1889) 13 Mad. 214.]
The question before the Madras High Court was regarding the validity of the adoption of a boy by a widow, aged13 years.
On the death of her husband, the husband's dead body was not allowed to be removed from her house for cremation, by the relatives of the adopted boy until she adopted the boy.
It was held that the adoption was not binding on the widow as her consent had been obtained by coercion.
According to Pollock and Mulla, by obstructing the removal of the corpse the possible offence tried to be committed was under section 297, Indian Penal Code, which provides punishments to a person for wounding the feelings of a person be offering indignity to any human corpse.
THREAT TO COMMIT SUICIDE
CHIKKAN AMMIRAJU V. CHIKKAM SESHAMA,[I.L.R. (1918) 41 Mad, 33.]
A, a Hindu, by a threat of suicide, induced his wife and son to execute a release deed in favour of A's brother in respect of certain properties claimed as their own by the wife and the son.
The question before the court was whether a threat to commit suicide could be considered to be an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code.
It was held by Wallis, C.J. and Seshagiri Ayyar, J. that a threat to commit suicide amounted to coercion within themeaning of section 15 of the Indian Contract Act and therefore the release deed was voidable.
It was observed that the threat to commit suicide could be considered to be an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code and also the threat to kill oneself was an act where a person was acting to his own prejudice and also to the prejudice of his wife and the son, and thus the requirements of section 15 were satisfied.
DISSENTING OPINION OF OLDFIELD
Oldfield, J., who dissented, was, however, of the view that suicide is not an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code(only an attempt to commit suicide is punishable under section 309, Indian Penal Code) and a threat to do thatcould not be considered to be a threat to do a forbidden act within the meaning of section 15 of the Contract Act.
VIEW OF POLLOCK AND MULLA
Pollock and Mulla are of the view that the minority view is correct, and they recommend amendment of section 15 soas to cover such cases of threats also. 7[Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 9th ed.,150.]
NEED FOR AMENDMENT OF SEC. 15
Committing or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code constitutes coercion. Actsforbidden by other penal laws are not included in the definition.
The Law Commission of India in it Report on the Indian Contract Act has recommended [13th Report (1958), p.21.] amendment of section 15 and inclusion in the definition other penal laws also.
UNLAWFUL DETAINING OF PROPERTY
According to section 15 coercion could also be caused by the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.
EXAMPLE
MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. KARUPAN CHETTI, I.L.R. (1927) Mad. 786 : ]
If an outgoing agent refuses to hand over the account books to the new agent until the principal executes releasein his favour, it is coercion.
IF THE DETENTION OF PROPERTY IS NOT UNLAWFUL, THERE IS NO COERCION.
BENGAL STONE CO. LTD. V. JOSEPH HYAM, (1918) Cal. L.J. 78.]
if a mortgagee refuses to convey the equity of redemption except on the terms dictated by him, there is nothing unlawful in it and, therefore, no coercion is caused in this case.
FORCIBLE DISPOSSESSION OF PROPERTY UNDER THREAT IS COERCION
If a person is dispossessed of his property under illegal threat that unless he parts with the possession he would be detained under MISA (Maintence of Internal Security), parting with the property under such threat amounts to coercion under section 15
KRISHAN LAL KALRA V. N.D.M.C. [A.I.R. 2001 DELHI 402.]
the plaintiff was given licence by the N.D.M.C. (New Delhi Muncipal Commitee) to run an open air restaurant inConnaught Circus, New Delhi.The lease was to expire on 31st May, 1978.
The plaintiff, who started running the Restaurant under the name and style "Rumble Open Air Restaurant", wasallegedly thrown out of the premises after taking forcible possession thereof without due process of law by the defendant, who sent demolition squad with police force on 7th August, 1976.
There was also a threat that the plaintiff would be detained under MISA, if he did not handover the possession ofthe property.
The plaintiff alleged that there was coercion and he filed the present suit claiming damages of Rs.10 lacs.
It was held that a person is not bound by any act done under duress or coercion.In this case the threat that the plaintiff would be detained under MISA amounted to coercion.
The plaintiffs suit was decreed for a sum of Rs. 9,11,525.12 with cost as well as interest @ 12% w.e.f. 7the August,1979, i.e., the date of filing the suit till the payment of the decreed amount
TO THE PREJUDICE OF A PERSON
It means that the act causing coercion should not necessarily be directed against the contracting party,it is enough that the act is to the prejudice of any person whatever, and with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.
EXAMPLE
If, A unlawfully detains B's son, C, in order to coerce B to enter into the agreement, the case would be coveredwithin this section.
Apart from that, it is also not necessary that the wrongful act causing coercion should proceed from the party to the contract.
Thus, if in order to coerce a widow to adopt a child, the relatives of the adopted boy do not allow the dead body of the widow's husband to be taken out of the home until the adoption is made, this is coercion. ([Ranganayakammav. Alwar Setti, I.L.R. (1889) 13 Mad. 214; ) ( Chuni Lal v. Maula Bakhsh, 161 I.C. 347.]
THREAT TO STRIKE IS NO COERCION
WORKMEN OF APPIN TEA ESTATE V. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, AI.R. 1966 Assam 115.
In this case the demand of the workers for bonus was accepted after a threat of strike.
The question which had arisen was, whether such a decision between the Union of the workers and the Indian TeaAssociation could be declared void on the ground that there was coercion.
It was held that because of the doctrine of collective bargaining under the Industrial Disputes Act, the demand of the workers could be backed by a threat of strike.Such a threat was neither a threat to commit an offence under the Indian Penal Code, nor was it unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property and hence it did not amount to coercion and as such the agreement was valid.
STATUTORY COMPULSION IS NO COERCION
When a statute requires a contract to be entered into, the consent in such a case is not deemed to be caused bycoercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.
ANDHRA SUGARS LTD. V. STATE OF A.P., [A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 599;]
If any canegrower offered to sell his sugarcane to a factory in a certain zone, the factory was bound to accept the offer under the Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1961, and accordingly theagreement was entered into.It was held that in such a case even though there was a legal compulsion for the factory to make the agreement, the agreement could not be said to be entered into by the lack of free consent, and there was no coercion either.
