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LANDMARK JUDGEMENT ON LIMITATION ACT
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PRELIMINARY
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CASE NAME
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HELD
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1. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 32
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The Supreme Court held that a statute of limitation typically bars the remedy of a claim but does not extinguish the underlying right. This means that while a court may not enforce a time-barred debt, the debt itself can continue to exist as a moral obligation.
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2. Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Mktg Ltd, (2012) 2 SCC 624
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The Supreme Court held that the term "prescribed period" refers strictly to the period of limitation established by statute, and does not include any discretionary extensions of time granted by a court.
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3. Rama Murthy v. Ravula Somasundaram, (2005) 6 SCC 614
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The Supreme Court of India held that a court is obligated to address the issue of limitation, even if the defendant does not raise it in their pleadings. This principle is derived from Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is a mandatory provision.
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4. Japani Saho v. Chandrashekhar Mahanty, AIR 2007 SC 2762
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The court observed that the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to criminal proceedings unless expressly provided. The court cited the legal maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi, meaning "lapse of time is no bar to the Crown," to affirm that generally, a crime does not expire with time.
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5. A.S.K. Krishnappa Chettiar v. K.S.V.V. Somiah, AIR 1964 SC 227
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The court ruled that the Limitation Act is an exhaustive and procedural statute governing the time limits for suits, appeals, and applications. Courts cannot extend its provisions by inference to proceedings that the law does not explicitly cover.
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6. Tilokchand Motichand v. H.P. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898
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The constitutionality of the Limitation Act is upheld, as it serves as a protective measure rather than a tool for obstruction. The State cannot impede access to the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution by imposing limitation periods.
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LIMITATION OF SUITS, APPEALS & APPLICATION
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7. V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao, (2005) 4 SCC 613
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The Supreme Court ruled that a court has a mandatory obligation to dismiss a suit that is barred by the law of limitation, even if the defendant fails to raise this defence.
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8. Ganesan v. TN. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board, (2019) 7 SCC 108
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The Supreme Court remarked that the suits, appeals, and applications mentioned in the Limitation Act, 1963, pertain to those intended for filing in a court of law, not before a statutory authority.
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9. Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Ltd., 2022
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If the last day for filing a suit, appeal, or application falls on a day when the court is closed, the party can institute the proceeding on the very next day the court reopens. A day when the Court may not as such be closed in physical sense, it would be 'deemed' to be closed, if during any part of its normal working hours, it remains closed on that day for any particular proceedings or work.
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10. Sandhya Rani v. Sudha Rani, AIR 1978 SC 537
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The Supreme Court interpreted the expression 'sufficient cause' for the purpose of condoning a delay. The court held that this term must be construed liberally to promote the cause of substantive justice and prevent meritorious matters from being dismissed on a mere technicality.
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11. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish Chand Shivhare, 2022
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The law of limitation binds everybody including the Government. The usual explanation of red tapism, pushing of files and the rigmarole of procedures cannot be accepted as sufficient cause - A different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down because the government is involved.
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12. Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh, AIR 1995 SC 75
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The Supreme Court held that Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be read together, with Section 8 acting as a proviso to the other two. This interpretation means that while Sections 6 and 7 provide for an extension of the limitation period for certain legal disabilities (like minority or insanity), Section 8 restricts that extension to a maximum of three years after the disability ends.
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13. Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537
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The Supreme Court held that it is mandatory for a court to apply the law of limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, even if it is not specifically pleaded by the parties.
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14. Angadi v. Hiranmayya, AIR 1972 SC 239
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The Supreme Court of India clarified the scope of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court held that Section 4 is a "concession," not an extension of the prescribed limitation period or a method for its calculation.
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15. Damodaran Pillai v. South Indian Bank, AIR 2005 SC 3460
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The Supreme Court held that when a delay cannot be excused under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a court cannot use its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to achieve the same result.
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16. Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361
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The Supreme Court clarified the requirements for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The court ruled that an applicant is not required to explain their conduct throughout the entire limitation period but must show sufficient cause for the delay that occurred after the limitation period expired.
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17. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. V. Mst. Katiji & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353
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Section 5 grants the court a dual discretion: firstly, to assess the adequacy of the cause, and secondly, even if sufficient cause is established, the term 'may' in Section 5 signifies that the court retains discretion regarding whether to pardon the delay.
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COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION
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18. M/s Saketh India Ltd. v. M/s India Securities Ltd, AIR 1999 SC 1090
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The Supreme Court affirmed the standard legal principle for computing a period of time: the day from which the period is to be reckoned is excluded, while the last day is included.
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19. N. Rajendran v. S. Valli, 2022
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The period spent in obtaining the copy can be excluded in calculating the period of limitation to file matrimonial appeals under Family Courts Act - The court determined that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies to appeals filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act. This allows for the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, including Section 12, which covers the exclusion of time for obtaining copies.
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20. India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani, AIR 2003 SC 2084
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The Supreme Court held that there is no requirement for a party to file a separate application to seek the benefit of excluding time as provided under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
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21. Madhavrao N. Patwardhan v. Ram Krishna, AIR 1958 SC 767
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The Supreme Court outlined the conditions necessary for invoking Section 14, emphasising the need for good faith and due diligence in prosecuting the previous suit or application, similarity of issues, and the court's inability to entertain the matter due to jurisdictional defects.
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22. Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1985 SC 39
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The Supreme Court held that the phrase "other causes of like nature" in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be interpreted ejusdem generis with the preceding expression, "defect of jurisdiction". This means that the other causes must be analogous to a defect of jurisdiction and must involve some preliminary matter that prevents the court from entertaining the case on its merits.
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23. Roshanlal Kuthalia and Ors v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi, AIR 1975 SC 824
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The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature" in Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act encompasses cases where defects, while not purely jurisdictional, bear similarities to such deficiencies.
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24. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaja Narain, AIR 1968 SC 960
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The Supreme Court clarified that under Section 12, the 'time requisite' for obtaining a copy of the decree refers to the time beyond the party's control spent in acquiring the copy.
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25. State of Kerala v. T.M. Chacko, (2009) 9 SCC 722
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The Supreme Court reiterated the principle under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, that a written acknowledgment of a debt, made before the expiry of the limitation period, initiates a fresh period of limitation from the date of that acknowledgment.
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26. Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. Kew Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd., 2022
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As per Section 18 of Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing a fresh period of limitation from the date on which the acknowledgement is signed. Such acknowledgement need not be accompanied by a promise to pay expressly or even by implication. However, the acknowledgement must be made before the relevant period of limitation has expired.
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27. Sant Lal v. Kamla Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 477
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The Supreme Court held that to claim an extension of the limitation period under Section 20 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff must prove both a payment of interest or part payment of principal and that this payment was acknowledged by some form of writing, either in the handwriting of the payer or signed by them.
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ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP BY POSSESSION
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28. RavinderKaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729
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The Supreme Court established that a person who has perfected their title to a property through adverse possession can initiate a lawsuit to recover possession if they are dispossessed. It was ruled that the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession falls within the purview of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, and there exists no impediment under the Limitation Act, 1963, to initiate legal action based on this ground in case of infringement of the plaintiff's rights.
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29. Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kumar, (2019) 8 SCC 729
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The Court laid down the following important points: A person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law. Once the period of 12 years is over even the right of the owner to eject the person expires and the possessory owner acquires the right, title and interest in the property.
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30. Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, (2019) 13 SCC 324
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The test to determine adverse possession requires that the possession must be actual, open, exclusive, hostile, and continuous over the statutory period. This must be initiated by the wrongful dispossession of the legal owner, and mere possession is not enough to convert into adverse possession.
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31. Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, (2020) 11 SCC 263
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The court emphasized that mere long-term possession is not enough; the person claiming title must prove with clear, unequivocal evidence that their possession was hostile to the true owner and amounted to an explicit denial of their title.
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32. Narasamma v. A. Krishnappa, (2020) 15 SCC 218
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The Supreme Court held that claiming ownership (title) and adverse possession from the same date are contradictory and cannot be maintained simultaneously. When asserting adverse possession, it is implicit that someone else is the rightful owner of the property.
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33. M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1
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The Supreme Court held that once a person has perfected their title to a property through adverse possession, they can use this title not just as a defense against the original owner, but also as a basis to initiate a suit for the recovery of possession if they are dispossessed by another party. Adverse possession therefore serves as both a "shield" and a "sword".
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