BNS 101 IPC-300.MURDER
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
SECONDLY
If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-
THIRDLY
If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-
FOURTHLY
If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
EXCEPTION 1-
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos: -
FIRST
That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
SECONDLY
That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
THIRDLY
That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
EXPLANATION
Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
EXCEPTION 2-
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise, in good faith, of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
EXCEPTION 3-
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
EXCEPTION 4-
Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
EXPLANATION
It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
EXCEPTION 5-
Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
BNS 101 (IPC Section 300) deals with the cases where culpable homicide is murder.
Therefore, an offence cannot amount to murder unless it falls within the definition of culpable homicide.
Murder includes culpable homicide, but a culpable homicide may or may not amount to murder. A case of culpable homicide is murder if it falls within any one of the four clauses of BNS 101 (IPC Section 300).
CLAUSE 1
ACT BY WHICH THE DEATH CAUSED IS DONE WITH THE INTENTION OF CAUSING DEATH. —
Where parents neglect to provide proper sustenance to their children although repeatedly warned of the consequences and the child dies, it will be murder. [Ganga Singh, (1873) 5 N.W.P. 44.]
IN R. VENKALU, [A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 171.]
The accused set fire to the cottage in which D was sleeping, locking the door of the cottage from outside so that D's servants who were sleeping outside might not come for help. He also took active steps to prevent the villagers from rendering any help to the deceased. Here the accused had an intention to kill D.
IN STATE OF KARNATAKA V. GANGADHARAIAH, [1997 CR. L.J. 4068 (SC)
The respondent married the deceased in or about the year 1971. Since then, the respondent used to frequently come home drunk and beat and ill-treat the deceased. (relevant as cause u/s 8 IEA) On the fateful day in the evening of April 17, 1985 the accused started quarrelling with his wife and when PW-5 tried to intervene, the deceased sent him back. At about 9 p.m. when the quarrel reached a high pitch, the deceased called her neighbour, PW-4 and asked him to fetch her mother PW-6 who lived nearby. Before they could reach accused gave a knife blow on the neck of his wife (deceased) which resulted in a severe bleeding injury.
On being so assaulted she started running away but fell down in front of a house. When (PW-6) and (PW4) reached they saw Papachhai lying dead. Presence of accused at the time of incident was proved. (relevant as facts making facts in issue as highly probable u/s 11 IEA) Witnesses saw accused running away from his house after death of his wife and could be apprehended only after three weeks. (relevant as conduct u/s 8 IEA)
There was no material showing that eyewitness was either inimical or interested witness. It was held that in the light of the above facts and evidence inference could be drawn that the accused alone and nobody else have committed murder of deceased.
Therefore, accused was held liable for the offence of murder.
IN M. SUSEELA V. SLATE OF TAMIL NADU, [1997 CR. L.J. 4390 (SC).
Selvaraj and Suseela, the wife of elder brother of Selvaraj were tried for murder of Seetha lakshmi, wife of Selvaraj (A-1) under Section 302 read with Section 34, IP. Code. The accused Selvaraj and his elder brother's family were living together in one room and the accused was a Rikshapuller. The deceased and the accused Selvaraj were married in October, 1984 but were not having good relations. The deceased was being ill-treated and it was also rumored that Selvaraj was having illicit relations with Suseela. Being fed up with this atmosphere, Seethalakshmi came to her parents' house but her mother, and father, consoled her and sent her back. On the fateful day i.e., 11th April, 1985 the quarrel between the two accused and the deceased continued for quite some time which was witnessed by many neighbours. Shanmugham (PW-3) inquired about the quarrel. At about 12.00 noon Krishnamurthi (PW-6) a close relative came to meet Seethalakshmi and on inquiry the accused told him that she had gone to Kumbakonam. Soon thereafter both the accused left on a bicycle. (relevant as conduct u/s 8 IEA) When Shanmugham returned at about 1.30 p.m. Selavaraj (A-1) told him that Seethalakshmi had committed suicide and her body was hanging to the ceiling. The accused requested him to help him in lowering down the dead body but he refused to do so. The accused himself lodged F.I.R. at about 8.00 p.m. (relevant as conduct u/s 8 IEA) The case was based on circumstantial evidence. But the court refused to accept it to be a case of suicide as the height of the roof and rafter was 12 ft. and it appears a difficult task for Seethalakshmi to tie a Nylon Saree to the rafter in the ceiling at such a height and then hang herself. It was further held that nail-scratch marks on neck of deceased and fracture of hyoid bone due to strangulation (relevant as effect u/s 7 IEA) and indications for suffocation shown in post mortem (relevant as opinion u/s 45 IEA) report proves that the deceased died a homicidal death. There was no reliable evidence on record except hearsay evidence (section 60 IEA applicable, oral evidence must be direct, hearsay evidence not admissible) to prove that the accused husband had illicit relations with his sister-in- law and it was because of that she had participated in the said crime. Therefore, conviction of Suseela was set aside by giving benefit of doubt but the conviction of husband was upheld.
CLAUSE 2
WITH THE INTENTION OF CAUSING SUCH BODILY INJURY AS THE OFFENDER KNOWS TO BE LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH
In case of an offence falling under this clause the mental attitude of the accused is two-fold. First, there is intention to cause bodily harm and secondly, there is the subjective knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury. Here the offender knows that bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death of the person. It applies to those special cases where the person injured is in such a condition or state of health that his death would be likely to be caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a person in sound health and where the person inflicting the injury knows that owing to such condition or slate of health, he is likely to cause the death of the person injured.
A case would fall under this clause if the offender, having knowledge that a person was suffering from some disease or was of unsound health, causes hurt to him which may not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death had the deceased been of sound health, but which with the special knowledge of the diseased condition of the deceased, his assailant must have known to be likely to cause his death. Here knowledge on the part of the offender imports certainty and not merely a probability. [Gabbar Pandey. (1927) 7 Pal. 638.]
CLAUSE 3
INJURY SUFFICIENT IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF NATURE TO CAUSE DEATH".—
Where a man intentionally inflicts bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, he would be liable for murder. Where a number of injuries are inflicted it is not necessary that each one of them should be sufficient to cause death, it would be sufficient if cumulatively such injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature lo cause death. [Brij Bhushhan, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 474.]
For the application of clause 3, two things need to be proved: one that the injury was intentionally inflicted and secondly, that the injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of any person.
That is, under this clause the emphasis is on the sufficiency of the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not depends upon the nature of the weapon used or part of body on which the injury is caused. [Anda, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 148.] Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
CLAUSE 4
KNOWLEDGE OF IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS ACT.—
This clause comprehends generally the commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all probability cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When such an act is done with the knowledge that death might be the probable result and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or injury as is likely to cause death, the offence is murder.
LAL BIHARI LAL V. EMPEROR. A.L.R. 1946 NAG. 120.
This clause applies to cases of dangerous action without an intention to cause specific bodily injury to any person, e.g., furious driving or firing at a target near the public road. However, the act done must be accompanied with the knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause
1.death, or
2. such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Further, the accused must have committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of
a. causing death; or
b. such injury as is likely to cause death.
RAM PRASAD'S CASE [A.L.R. 1968 S.C. 881.]
the Supreme Court observed that although clause 4 of section 300 is usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause the death of any particular person the clause may on its terms be used in those cases where there is such callousness towards the result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the act is likely to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
For example, causing death by firing a loaded gun into a crowd or by poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water.
NGA BA TU, [A.L.R. 1921 L.B. 26.]
a snake charmer professed by tattooing to render persons immune from the effect of snakebite, caused a poisonous snake to bite D whom he had tattooed but who died. It was held that the burden of proving that the accused was justified in believing and in fact believed that he could give immunity lay on him and because he failed to discharge that burden, he was guilty of murder.
BHARAT. (1920) 23 CRI. L.J. 179.
In another case the accused offered a child to a crocodile under a superstitious but a bona fide belief that the child would be returned unharmed, but the child was killed. He was held guilty of murder under this clause.
GORACHAND GOPEE [5 W.R. 45 (F.B.)
Sir Barnes Peacock, CJ. pointed out that clause (4) is designed for that class of cases where the act of the accused is not directed against any one in particular but there is that recklessness or negligence, which places the lives of many in jeopardy, of which the accused is well aware.
EMPEROR V. DHIRAJIA, [A.I.R. 1940 ALL. 486.]
A young village woman left her home with her six months' old baby in her arms on account of her husband's ill treatment.
After some time, her husband went out in pursuit of her and when she heard him coming after her, she turned around in a panic, ran a short distance with the baby on her arms and then jumped into an open nearby well.
The baby died and the woman was rescued and suffered minor injuries. She was charged with murder of the child and attempt to commit suicide.
In another case, the accused a woman left her house as her life has become unbearable owing to domestic troubles. She went with her three children to a well and jumped in it along with the children. She was saved but the children died. It was held that the accused jumped into the well with the knowledge that it was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause the death of her children and, therefore, she was guilty of murder. [Gyarsibai. 1953 Cr. L.J. 588.]
A placed a bomb in a medical store and gave the people inside three minutes to get out before the bomb exploded. 'B' an arthritic patient, failed to escape and was killed. The act of A was imminently dangerous act. Therefore, A will be liable for committing murder of B.
GOBADUR BHOOYAN. (1870) 13 W.R. (CR.) 55
A threat caused by incarnations or a belief in witchcraft does not justify the causing of death. So also 'divine influence or inspiration' cannot be pleaded in defense to a charge of an offence. [Munniswami v. Emperor, 1937 M.W.N. 93.]
This point was made clear in a case where the accused had cut the deceased woman with a sword several times, and when she had fallen down exhausted, surrounded her with hay and set fire to it in spite of the protests of the relations of the deceased woman. She sustained several burn injuries and died the next day.
The accused pleaded that he did all this for the purpose of exorcising a devil which was believed to have possessed the woman and that when doing all this he was beside himself owing to divine influence.
It was held that such a defense was not permitted by law and the accused was guilty of murder under clause 4 of BNS 101 (IPC Section 300).
MINAI W/O HUDKIA V. EMPEROR, A.I.R. 1938 NAG. 318
Where a woman, with a motive to get rid of her husband, had administered in his food a fatal dose of dhatura, the conclusion to be drawn is that she has committed murder unless her explanation is such that it leads to a conclusion otherwise or creates a doubt in the mind of the Court.
The case of K.M. Nanawati v. State of Maharashtra is related to:
a. Theft
b. Dacoity
c. Abetment
d. Grave and sudden provocation
Ans(d)
In which one of the following cases did the Supreme Court explain the concept of grave and sudden provocation as a mitigating circumstance reducing the gravity of the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
a. State v. Dasrath
b. Jagroop Singh v. State of Haryana
c. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra
d. Ujagar Singh v. Emperor
Ans(c)
Consider the following statements:
To claim the benefit of provocation in reducing the liability for murder the offender must prove that the:
1. provocation was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause a person of ordinary temper to lose his self-control.
2. provocation was grave and sudden to justify the killing
3. provocation was so grave that it would stir a desire for revenge
4. sufficient time did not elapse so as to cool down the passion of these statements:
a. 1 alone is correct
b. 2 and 3 are correct
c. 1, 3 and 4 are correct
d. 1, 2 and 4 are correct
Ans.(d)
In the context of the exception of grave & sudden provocation, which of the following is correct:
a. provocation should not be voluntarily provoked by the offender
b. lawful exercise of the right of private defence does not give provocation
c. lawful exercise of powers by a public servant in obedience to the law does not amount to provocation
d. all the above
Ans. (d)
'S' is found in possession of property reasonably suspected to be stolen by him and is arrested by T', a police officer. 'S' is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest and fires at him but kills 'D' who was standing near 'P', neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill 'D'. This is:
a. culpable homicide not amounting to murder, because 'S' had been deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation.
b. murder, because provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in lawful discharge of his powers.
c. culpable Homicide not amounting to murder, because the death of 'D' occurred by mistake or accident.
d. None of these
Ans. (b)