Q.(a) Admittedly there was wide-spread strike by non-gazetted officers of the State between 5th September to 13th October, 1980. Various offices including those of the Deputy Commissioner as well as majority of Courts were not functioning properly, because of strike. Though the strike was called off on 13th October, 1980, it took some time before the employees came back to serve and normalcy returned.

State filed an appeal on 15th October, 1980. Period of limitation had expired on 12th October, 1980. An application was filed for condonation of delay on the ground that there was a general strike and the work in the offices was disrupted. How would you decide?

(b) A filed a suit for possession at Ambala against B. The subordinate Judge at Ambala dismissed the suit. A filed an appeal against the judgment and the decree of the subordinate judge, Ambala, before the District Judge of the adjoining district and not at Ambala. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the said Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Thereafter A filed an appeal before the District Judge, Ambala. It was barred by time. A prayed for condonation of delay, relying on section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Decide and give reasons. (D.J.S. 1989)


Q. In a partition suit Court found the value of suit properties beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction and returned the plaint on 10.08.1988. On account of compromise with some claimant some properties were deleted and the value of the suit came within the jurisdiction of the Court. The plaintiff re-presented the plaint in the same Court on 12.06.1988. He claimed exclusion of time between the date of filing of suit, 20.11.1986, and re-presentation of the plaint, under section 14 of the Limitation Act. He urged that he must be deemed to have been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding. Decide, Give reasons. (D.J.S. 1990)


Q.(i) A money decree was passed on 30.07.1968. The Appellate Court affirmed it on 17.10.1969 and no stay was applied for, during the pendency of appeal. Execution application was filed on 30.04.1981. Judgment Debtor contended that it was barred by time as the limitation prescribed for its execution by Art.136 Limitation Act, 1963 was 12 years from the date "when the decree became enforceable" and in this case the decree was enforceable from 30.07.1968. Decide with reasons whether the application for execution was barred by time?

(ii) The Court passed award in land acquisition reference on 17.07.1970. Application for certified copy was moved on 31.08.1971 copy obtained on 05.01.1972 and appeal was filed on 19.01.1972. It was barred by time. Land Acquisition Officer filed application to have the delay excused under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 alleging that the government pleader failed to apply for certified copy, obtain it and forward it with his opinion; there was utter confusion during his time and department did not know in which cases appeal were not filed; he played fraud and over a crore of rupees would be the loss to the government on account of such fraud; that correspondence exchanged with him, produced here, would show how negligent and uncooperative he was with the department. The respondent opposed it and contended that notice of the award was duly served by the Court on the department and the delay is not on account of bonafide mistake of the counsel and sufficient cause had not been shown for condonation of delay of over one year.

Decide application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. (D.J.S. 1991)


Q.(i) A sum of Rs.13,000/- was due from the defendant to the plaintiff (both trading firms) on account of credit transactions upto 17.10.1976. A suit for its recovery was filed on 20.08.1981. It is barred by time. The plaintiff pleaded in plaint and proved defendant's letter dated 30.10.1978. Ex. A/1, an acknowledgement, which if accepted will save the limitation. The defendant says that this letter was written on 30.10.1976 and the year '1978' mentioned, is only a typographical error. The plaintiff argued that even if there was such an error section 18(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a bar in proving it; that managing partner of defendant, DWI, has admitted in cross examination that there was an acknowledgement of this debt in the Balance Sheet of the defendant made and signed on 07.07.1978, that if there was any doubt in the date of the letter Ex.A/1 the benefit should be given to it. The documentary evidence produced by the parties suggested that letter Ex.A/1 must have been written in 1976. Is there force in the arguments of the plaintiff? Decide the issue of bar of limitation. Note : Section 18(2) Limitation Act, 1963 permits proof of evidence regarding time of signing the acknowledgement in writing when it is undated.

(ii) A sum of Rs.22,400 was payable to X on 01.06.1962 against a paid up Life Insurance Policy. X took loans from L.I.C. against the security of this policy. On 01.08.1962 L.I.C. paid Rs.18,205 to X after deducting the amount of second loan and inadvertently the amount of first loan, Rs.14,474 was not deducted. This mistake was discovered on 20.05.1966, and of first loan, Rs.14,474, was not deducted. This mistake was discovered on 20.05.1966, and suit for its realization was filed on 08.07.1967. It is barred by time. LIC relies on section 17 of Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that limitation for filing a suit for relief from consequences of a mistake will not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered mistakes or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. It is submitted that the mistake could not be discovered in time on account of voluminous records and large number of business transactions and that LIC should not be allowed to suffer for the inadvertent lapse on the part of its staff. X says that mistake could have been easily discovered as the accounts of the LIC are audited periodically and there was mention of 'second loan' in the ledger.

Only triable issue is whether the suit is within time? Decide it. (D.J.S. 1991)


Q. Some construction work was awarded to the petitioner. Contract period was eight months and scheduled completion was 16.09.1985. Work however could be completed by the petitioner only beyond schedule period i.e. on 30.05.1986 and after extension was granted for completion of the same. In the final bill dated 11.06.1986 the respondent made deduction out of the final bill by way of penalty in terms of the contract. The petitioner protested against the aforesaid deduction by letter dated 09.07.1987. On 17-06.1989, the petitioner invoked the arbitration agreement regarding the aforesaid deducted amount. The respondent raised the plea that claim of the petitioner is barred by limitation. Decide that plea giving reasons. (D.J.S. 1999)


Q. A, owner of the property, died leaving behind wife, son and daughter. His widow executed a Will in favour of the daughter bequesting entire property to her. The daughter sold the property to B on 06.02.1953. B filed suit against C alleging that he was illegitimate son of A's son and had forcibly trespassed in the property in 1971. The trial court held that C was legitimate and was born in 1945 and that sale deed in favour of B was void but dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit has been filed before expiry of 12 years from the date C attained majority and, therefore, B had not yet perfected title to the property by virtue of section 27 of the Limitation Act. Appeal has been filed on the ground that C attained majority in 1966 on completion of 21 years and he could have instituted suit for recovery of possession within three years therefrom i.e. 1969 but the present suit was filed in 1971 which was beyond said period of three years and, therefore, B had perfected title to the property. The appeal is contested on the ground that period of limitation to institute suit for recovery of possession is 12 years from the date of his attaining majority and consequently when B filed suit in 1971, he could not have acquired title under Section 27 of the Limitation Act. Decide the appeal giving reasons for your decision. (D.J.S. 1999)


Q. A petition under section 20 of the Arbitration Act has been filed on 09.02.96 for referring the dispute between the parties to arbitrator in view of arbitration clause in contract between the parties. It is alleged that petitioner wrote letters dt. 23.05.1989, 20.02.1991 and 20.03.1992 to respondent calling upon him to appoint arbitrator for adjudication of disputes as tabulated in Annexure A. The petitioner also moved an application under Section 5 read with section 14 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the petition on the ground that he had initially moved the Court in 1992 and had been pursuing the remedy but at appellate stage on 18.01.1996 the proceedings were held ab initio defective as the petitioner firm was not registered on the date of initiation of proceedings. During those proceedings however the petitioner firm obtained registration on 26.02.1993. The respondent contested the petition/application contending inter alia that the suit is barred by limitation as provisions of section 5 or 14 are not applicable and even sufficient cause has not been made out. Give your decision vide reasoned order. (D.J.S. 1999).


Q. The plaintiff had advanced a loan of Rs.3000/- to the defendant by issuing a cheque on 27.08.1981. Interest was agreed to be paid @ Rs.18% p.a. Interest as agreed was paid upto 27.02.1982. The defendant issued a cheque for Rs.270/- drawn on 16.04.1984 on account of interest for the period 28.02.1982 to 28.03.1983. The cheque when presented by the plaintiff to the bank was dishonoured for want of funds. The suit was filed on 04.04.1987. The defendant raised objection that the suit is barred by time. Decide this plea giving reasons for your decision. (D.J.S. 1999)


Q.(a) A suit was filed for specific performance to execute sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs on the allegations that defendants No.1 & 2 failed to honour their agreement dated 12.04.1978 vide which they agreed to sell their building. X was added as defendant No.3 alleging that he had similar right of getting specific performance of agreement in question but has not joined the plaintiffs in the suit and, therefore, had been impleaded as defendant. As per agreement, one-half of the property was proposed to be purchased by plaintiffs. While the other half was to be purchased by X. Subsequently X is sought to be transposed as plaintiff. This is opposed on the ground that this is not permissible under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. and his transposition from array of defendants as plaintiff is far beyond the period of limitation for enforcing the agreement in relation to sale of his half share in the property in question and section 21 of the Limitation Act will apply and the suit will be barred by limitation. Decide the controversy giving reasons.

(b) Eviction petition filed by A against his tenant B was dismissed on 25.09.1956 accepting plea of B that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. A filed appeal, which was allowed on 30.09.1957 holding that B was tenant and grounds existed for his eviction. (During pendency of appeal, C purchased the property from A on 18.06.1957 subject to decision of appeal). B filed Revision, which was dismissed on 19.09.1958 holding that B was tenant and three months time was granted for vacation of premises. C was in Govt. Service and was moving from place to place. On 24.07.1969 C filed eviction petition against B, who contended that he was not a tenant and had acquired title by adverse possession. On 05.08.1970, C filed suit for possession based on title, which was resisted on the ground that B had acquired title by adverse possession; suit was in reality in nature of execution of earlier eviction order but execution of decree was time-barred and the suit stood barred by section 11 and 47 C.P.C. C refutes all this and says that the suit was based on fresh cause of action and has been filed within 12 years from the final eviction order. Give your decision on the points raised. (D.J.S. 2000)


Q.(a) In 1893, oral mortgage in respect of land was executed for Rs.53/-. On 11.01.1960, mortgagees sold their mortgage rights to A vide a registered sale deed. In the meanwhile, in 1959, B had purchased the suit land from the original mortgagor vide registered sale deed. In 1980, B filed suit for possession by way of redemption of suit land against A, who raised redemption started on the very date of execution and thus period of 60 years is to be counted from 1893. On this point, contentions of B are that (1) till Act of 1913 came in force, there was no period of limitation for oral mortgage and hence limitation cannot start before the date when this Act came into force; (2) in this case neither mortgagors offered to pay mortgage amount, nor mortgagees communicated satisfaction of the mortgage amount through usufruct from land, hence right to redeem could not be said to have accrued, so question of running of period of limitation never arose and (3) moreover, since in 1960, the original mortgage had acknowledged the original mortgage, therefore in view of section 18 of the Limitation Act, period of limitation is revived, which would only start from the date of acknowledgement, hence suit filed in 1980 would be within limitation. Discussion the merits of the respective contentions of the parties and give your verdict.

(b) Cheques dated 15th, 16th March, 1995 bounced, when presented for encashment. Notices were served on accused on 29.09.1995, who failed to pay amount within 15 days as per section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Period of 15 days in the present case expired on 14.10.1996. Complaints were filed on 15.10.1995. Objection was raised that the complaints were filed beyond time. Decide this objection. (D.J.S. 2000)


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